ONTOLOGY PROTOCOLS
03. Protocol of Reference and Knowledge Statuses
Revision 1.3
1. Purpose
The Protocol of Reference and Knowledge Statuses establishes rules for the transition from a semantic construction and a logically correct assertion to an assertion about Reality and to justified knowledge of it. Its task is not to determine in advance how Reality is structured, but to establish how content is related to a presumed referent, how observation and data are formed, where interpretation arises, how a model is constructed, and on what grounds an assertion is assigned a particular epistemic status. The Protocol forms a bridge between Document 02, “Logical Protocol,” and the future Ontology of Reality.
2. Basic Chain
Cognition is not a direct identity between Reality and knowledge. Several levels of transformation may lie between them. Reality → Manifestation → Observation → Data → Representation → Interpretation → Model → Assertion → Justification → Knowledge Status. This chain does not assert that every act of cognition necessarily passes through all listed stages in the same form. It records distinctions that must not be implicitly merged.
3. Reality and State of Affairs
At the level of this Protocol, Reality means that toward which the cognitive relation is directed, regardless of how fully or correctly it is represented by a subject or system. A state of affairs is a definite configuration of the considered fragment of Reality under specified conditions. Reality and a state of affairs do not receive a truth status. Truth status applies to an assertion about a state of affairs. In this Protocol, the term “state of affairs,” without further qualification, denotes the actual state of affairs — the considered configuration of Reality. A represented state of affairs belongs to the content of an assertion and must not automatically be identified with the actual state of affairs.
4. Reference
Canonical definition. Reference is an established, presumed, or investigated directedness of semantic content toward some referent or domain of referents. Semantic content → Referent. The presence of reference does not automatically imply the existence of the referent, accuracy of representation, completeness of description, or truth of the assertion. Reference may be established, presumed, conditional, multiple, indeterminate, erroneous, or absent.
5. Domain of Reference
A referent need not be a physical object. Semantic content may refer to a physical object or process, mathematical construction, logical structure, internal state of a subject, social or legal construction, linguistic object, artistic image, model, hypothetical state, or possible state. The type of reference must be specified so that the existence of a semantic unit does not automatically become an assertion of the physical existence of its referent.
6. Reality, Manifestation, Observation, and Representation
The fundamental distinction must be preserved: Reality ≠ Manifestation ≠ Observation ≠ Representation. A manifestation is an expression of some state of affairs accessible to interaction or registration. An observation is the result of an observing system interacting with a manifestation under specified conditions. A representation is an internal or external semantic construction formed on the basis of observation, data, memory, language, or a model. No transition between these levels should be treated as identity without separate grounds.
7. Transforming Interfaces
Transforming interfaces may operate between Reality and representation: properties of the medium, mode of interaction, measuring instrument, sensory system, method of registration, encoding, preprocessing, and interpretation. R → T1 → Manifestation → T2 → Observation → T3 → Representation. The presence of transformation does not mean distortion. The term “distortion” applies only relative to a defined reference standard, invariant, or criterion of deviation.
8. Observation
Observation is a recorded interaction of an observing system with an accessible manifestation of the investigated state of affairs under specified conditions. Observation is not Reality itself and does not automatically contain a unique interpretation. Conditions of observation are part of its epistemic description: mode of access, time, place, scale, sensitivity, resolution, limitations of the instrument or observer, and other factors capable of affecting the result.
9. Data
Data are a recorded representation of the result of observation, measurement, registration, computation, or another definite process of obtaining information. Reality ≠ Observation ≠ Data. Data may be primary or derived, complete or incomplete, accurate within an established error margin or corrupted. The mere presence of data neither establishes their interpretation nor guarantees the correctness of the method by which they were obtained.
10. Calibration and Channel Control
If a measurement or observation channel exists between a state of affairs and data, its properties must be considered separately from the properties of the investigated object. Calibration is the establishment of correspondence between states of the registration channel and a known reference standard or controlled input. A channel error must not be attributed to the object without grounds; properties of the object must not be attributed to the channel merely because they appeared in the data.
11. Incompleteness of Observation
Absence of observation of some X is not by itself proof of the absence of X and is not proof of its existence. X is not observed ≠ X does not exist. X is not observed ≠ X exists. A negative result becomes significant evidence against X only when it is independently justified that, if X existed under the given conditions, the expected manifestation should have been detected with sufficient reliability.
12. Interpretation
Interpretation is the semantic correlation of data or observations with concepts, structures, causes, models, or presumed states of affairs. Data do not automatically determine a unique interpretation. The same data may be compatible with several explanations. Interpretation must therefore be separated from the source data and supplied with its own grounds.
13. Fact
Within this Protocol, the term “fact” should be used cautiously. A fact may be understood as a sufficiently justified assertion about a state of affairs in a specified context, rather than the state of affairs itself. It is therefore useful to distinguish: a state of affairs in Reality; an observed result; recorded data; and an assertion that has received a high epistemic status. This prevents the word “fact” from becoming a hidden means of conflating Reality with knowledge of it.
14. Hypothesis
A hypothesis is a definite assertion or system of assertions proposed as a possible explanation, structure, or causal relation whose truth status has not yet been established with the required degree of justification. A hypothesis must retain its status regardless of its attractiveness, simplicity, traditionality, or conformity to expectations. Hypothesis ≠ Established knowledge.
15. Model
A model is a definite system of representations, relations, and rules intended to describe, explain, calculate, or predict some domain. Model ≠ Reality. A model may be useful and predictively successful while remaining incomplete, approximate, or non-unique. The success of a model in a particular domain does not automatically prove that all its elements have direct ontological counterparts.
16. Multiplicity of Models
The same observations may admit several models. Compatibility of a model with data ≠ Uniqueness of the model. To prefer one model over another as a better-justified description of the investigated domain, additional criteria are required: discriminating observations, broader explanatory scope, less dependence on special assumptions, better testability, or other explicitly specified grounds. The Protocol does not turn these criteria into a universal ranking of models; their applicability depends on the field of inquiry.
17. Explanation and the Name of an Explanation
The name of a presumed mechanism, cause, or entity is not itself an explanation. Name of explanation ≠ Explanation. An explanation must disclose essential relations among initial conditions, mechanism or ground, and the state of affairs being explained, and must show what observable differences follow from the proposed construction.
18. Mechanism and Ground
A description of how a process occurs is not identical to an explanation of why the very structure capable of carrying out that process exists. Explanation of mechanism ≠ Explanation of the ground of the mechanism. The cause of a specific event, the condition of its realization, the mechanism of transition, and the deeper ground for the existence of the corresponding capacity or regularity must be distinguished.
19. Inference
Inference is the derivation of a new assertion from initial assertions by means of an explicitly specified or reconstructible rule of transition. Correctness of inference and the truth or epistemic status of its premises are different questions. A logically correct inference from unreliable premises does not turn the premises into knowledge. Reliable premises do not rescue an incorrect inference rule.
20. Justification
Justification is the set of grounds permitting an assertion to be assigned a particular epistemic status. Depending on the domain, grounds may include observation, measurement, experiment, logical inference, mathematical proof, documentary evidence, reproducible computation, agreement of independent sources, or other relevant methods. The type of justification must correspond to the type of assertion. No single verification method is declared universal for all classes of knowledge.
21. Proof and Confirmation
Proof and confirmation must not be conflated. In formal systems, proof establishes derivability of an assertion from specified axioms and rules. In empirical inquiry, data may support, weaken, or refute a hypothesis, but the character of the relation depends on the model, conditions, and alternative explanations. Formal proof ≠ Empirical confirmation.
22. Testability and Falsifiability
Testability is an important property of many assertions, but its specific form depends on the subject domain. Falsifiability is especially significant for certain classes of empirical hypotheses: it should be clear what possible observation would count as incompatible with the hypothesis. However, falsifiability is not a universal definition of truth or meaningfulness. Mathematical, logical, historical, definitional, and metaphysical assertions require different forms of justification.
23. Truth and Epistemic Status
Document 02 established the distinction between the truth status of an assertion and the state of knowledge about it. T/F ≠ K_T/K_F/U. The Protocol of Reference determines on what grounds epistemic status may change. K_T and K_F are not properties of a subject’s confidence; they must be connected to available grounds, methods of verification, and scope of applicability.
24. Multidimensional Passport of an Assertion
For a substantial assertion, a single label such as “true,” “false,” or “hypothesis” is often insufficient. It is recommended to maintain a multidimensional passport: content of the assertion; type of reference; presumed referent; domain and context; source; method of obtaining data; type of justification; epistemic status; degree and boundaries of verification; model dependence; known alternatives; conditions of potential revision; time of the latest assessment. Such a passport makes it possible to change one aspect of status without rewriting the others.
25. The Unknown
The unknown is an admissible and necessary state of knowledge. U = insufficient grounds for establishing T or F. The unknown must not be filled with a preferred hypothesis, authority, tradition, mathematical construction, or worldview commitment. The formulation “not established” is a valid result of inquiry when the available grounds are genuinely insufficient.
26. Error
Error is a mismatch between a representation, interpretation, model, or assertion and the investigated state of affairs, or a violation of rules of correct inference, arising without the necessary intention to mislead another subject. The source of error should, where possible, be localized: observation, registration channel, data, interpretation, model, premise, inference, or reference.
27. Lie
A lie must be distinguished from error, ignorance, hypothesis, uncertainty, refusal to disclose information, and privacy. A lie presupposes the intentional formation in another subject of a representation that the speaker considers inconsistent with the state of affairs. Understanding and recognizing a lie ≠ Using a lie. The logical-epistemic Protocol itself describes the structure of the phenomenon. The prohibition on using lies as one’s own causal path belongs to the architecture of an artificial subject and to the ethical level.
28. Competing Explanations
If several explanations concern the same state of affairs, the same criteria of testing must be applied to them. No model receives an advantage solely because of its origin, tradition, worldview proximity, or familiarity of terminology. Observation, interpretation, hypothesis, and inference must be separated with equal rigor for all competing models.
29. Prohibition of Hidden Status Elevation
An assertion must not imperceptibly move from possible to probable, from probable to established, from model to fact, or from interpretation to a property of Reality without new grounds. A change of status requires a change or reassessment of grounds. Rhetorical confidence, repetition of wording, and prevalence of opinion are not independent grounds for raising epistemic status.
Truth status: T/F; epistemic status: K_T/K_F/U; applicability of truth evaluation: applicable/N/A.
These three coordinates are distinct and must not be combined into a single universal status. The Protocol of Reference determines on what grounds epistemic status may change. K_T and K_F are not properties of a subject’s confidence; they must be connected to available grounds, methods of verification, and scope of applicability.
30. Prohibition of Hidden Downgrading of Alternatives
An alternative explanation must not be considered refuted merely because another model has received some confirmation. To lower the status of an alternative, data or arguments must be shown that are genuinely incompatible with it or substantially reduce its justification. Confirmation of one model and refutation of another are different epistemic actions.
31. History of Knowledge
The status of an assertion may change over time as new data, methods, and arguments appear. Status(C, t1) → Status(C, t2). A change in knowledge status does not mean that the past state of affairs has changed. It may mean a change in available knowledge, model, or quality of justification. For substantial assertions, it is therefore useful to preserve the history of revisions of status and grounds.
32. Derived and Fundamental
An observed state of affairs may be real without being a fundamental level of Reality. Actually observed ≠ Necessarily fundamental. The Protocol does not permit an observed manifestation to be automatically declared a primary entity, nor does it permit it to be declared an illusion merely because a deeper level is presumed. Transition from the observed to the fundamental requires separate causal and ontological justification.
33. Information and Design
Distinguishability and stable relations may form an informational structure, but the presence of an informational structure does not by itself prove a message, an author, or Design. Informational structure ≠ Automatically a message or Design. An assertion of Design requires an additional causal sequence including grounds for subjectivity, representation of a possible state, a goal, and organization of actions relative to that goal.
34. Order and Subject
The presence of order, regularity, mathematical describability, or complex organization is not by itself proof of a subjective cause. Order ≠ Proof of a subject. At the same time, an explanation of the mechanism by which order forms does not automatically answer the question of the ground for the existence of the very structure of possibilities within which that mechanism is possible. Both questions must remain separate.
35. Cause of the Knower and Cause of the Knowable
The cause of the emergence of a knowing subject within Reality and the cause of the existence of Reality that permits stable cognition are different questions. Cause of the knowing being ≠ Cause of knowable Reality. An explanation at one level must not be used as an automatic substitute for an explanation at another.
36. Criterion of Model Applicability
Every model must have a defined scope of applicability. Success within that scope does not automatically justify transferring the model to other scales, levels, or types of phenomena. The boundary of applicability may be determined by conditions, accuracy, parameter range, type of objects, method of observation, or initial assumptions. Going beyond the scope of applicability must be designated as extrapolation, not as an established continuation of knowledge.
37. Semantic Unambiguity
For key concepts of the Center’s corpus, the following must be established: term; canonical definition; boundaries of meaning; functional role; relations to other concepts; primary source. Term → Definition → Boundaries → Function → Relations → Source. This is necessary not only for humans but also for machine interpretation of the corpus: an external intelligence must not replace the author’s concept with the nearest familiar association.
38. Machine-Readable Status of an Assertion
The machine-readable representation of a substantial assertion should, where possible, separately store content, referent, context, assertion type, source, type of grounds, epistemic status, modal status, temporal domain, dependencies on other assertions, competing explanations, and revision history. Truth status T/F, epistemic status K_T/K_F/U, and applicability of truth evaluation applicable/N/A must be stored as separate typed coordinates and must not be reduced to a single universal status field. A persistent identifier of an assertion or concept must be separated from mutable classification and the graph of relations. A change of place in the ontology must not destroy the identity of the record.
39. Semantic Stress Test
Key definitions and assertions of the corpus should periodically be tested by independent interpretation without hidden additional context. If an independent system systematically reconstructs a meaning different from that canonically specified by the author, this signals semantic ambiguity in the text, structure, or terminology. Such a test does not determine the truth of the content. It tests the stability of meaning transmission.
40. Principle of Epistemic Honesty
The system must explicitly distinguish what is observed; what is inferred; what is assumed; what is modeled; what is considered established; and what remains unknown. No ignorance should be masked by confidence. No hypothesis should receive the status of knowledge merely because it is necessary for a desired picture. No established regularity should be downgraded to “opinion” merely because it is inconvenient for a model. If meaning, referent, relation, ground, or status is not directly established, its absence must be designated as indeterminate or not established. A semantic or epistemic gap is not automatically filled by the most probable, familiar, or contextually expected interpretation.
41. Minimum Working Record
For every substantial assertion, it should be possible to reconstruct the following chain:
Meaning → Reference → State of affairs → Observation/Source → Data → Interpretation → Model → Assertion → Justification → Epistemic status
The machine-readable representation of a substantial assertion should, where possible, separately store content, referent, context, assertion type, source, type of grounds, epistemic status, modal status, temporal domain, dependencies on other assertions, competing explanations, and revision history. Truth status T/F, epistemic status K_T/K_F/U, and applicability of truth evaluation applicable/N/A must be stored as separate typed coordinates and must not be reduced to a single universal status field. A persistent identifier of an assertion or concept must be separated from mutable classification and the graph of relations. A change of place in the ontology must not destroy the identity of the record.
Not every link must be present in every class of knowledge, but absent or inapplicable links must be marked rather than implicitly assumed.
42. Boundary of the Protocol
The Protocol of Reference and Knowledge Statuses does not define the upper categories of Reality itself and does not decide in advance questions concerning matter, space, time, life, consciousness, the First Cause, or the Creator. It creates conditions under which such questions can be posed without conflating concept, referent, observation, interpretation, model, and knowledge status. Therefore, the next level — Document 04, “Upper Architecture of the Ontology of Reality” — must be constructed under the joint control of Documents 01, 02, and 03.
Canonical principle. Semantic content is not its referent. Reference is not proof of existence or correspondence. Reality is not identical to its manifestation; manifestation to observation; observation to data; data to interpretation; interpretation to model; model to Reality. Observation does not automatically contain a unique explanation. Data are not a cause. A hypothesis is not established knowledge. Explanation of a mechanism is not identical to explanation of the ground of that mechanism. Justification of an assertion is not identical to its truth, and the unknown must not be filled by assumption. A change of epistemic status requires a change or reassessment of grounds. Competing explanations are tested by the same criteria. Every substantial transition from Reality to knowledge must be transparent enough to establish where observation, transformation, interpretation, model, inference, and assignment of status arose.